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Article

Government Regulation of Irrationality:
Moral and Cognitive Hazards
Jonathan Klick† and Gregory Mitchell††
Several years ago the ethicist Daniel Wikler provocatively
asked, “If we claim that relative intellectual superiority justifies restricting the liberties of the retarded, could not exceptionally gifted persons make the same claim concerning persons
of normal intelligence?”1 Wikler’s question, posed originally to
raise doubts about paternalism directed at the developmentally
disabled, possesses a new relevance today, as legal elites increasingly claim that “persons of normal intelligence” exhibit
numerous irrational tendencies that justify restrictions on
market and nonmarket transactions.2 These new regulatory
† Jeffrey A. Stoops Professor of Law and Courtesy Professor of Economics, Florida State University, jklick@law.fsu.edu.
†† Sheila M. McDevitt Professor of Law and Courtesy Professor of Psychology, Florida State University, gmitchel@law.fsu.edu. Please address correspondence to either author at Florida State University College of Law, 425 W.
Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, FL 32306-1601. An earlier version of this paper
benefited from the comments of Amitai Aviram, Tyler Cowen, Matthias Hild,
Adam Hirsch, Dave Klein, Brett McDonnell, Peter Oh, Jeff Rachlinski, Mark
Seidenfeld, Alex Tabarrok, Phil Tetlock, and participants in a faculty workshop at the University of Virginia School of Law.
1. Daniel Wikler, Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded, 8 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 377, 377 (1979).
2. This new paternalism represents a fairly simple and direct application
of the dominant message emanating from the emerging behavioral law and
economics movement, namely that people of normal, and even superior, intelligence fail to pursue their interests rationally in many important situations.
See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 633 (1999)
(“These cognitive illusions—sometimes referred to as ‘biases’—are not limited
to the uneducated or unintelligent, and they are not readily capable of being
unlearned. Instead, they affect us all with uncanny consistency and unflappable persistence.” (footnotes omitted)); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541 (1998) (“In its
normative orientation, conventional law and economics is often strongly antipaternalistic. . . . [B]ounded rationality pushes toward a sort of anti-
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proposals range from hard forms of paternalism, in which the
government determines what is best for citizens and accordingly restricts the freedom of citizens to act otherwise, to softer
forms of paternalism, in which the government regulates the
form in which information and options are presented to citizens
and restricts the role of laypersons in the market, legal, and political systems without completely controlling choices.3

antipaternalism—a skepticism about antipaternalism, but not an affirmative
defense of paternalism.”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1085 (2000). Courts seem to be increasingly
open to the quasi-rationality message offered by behavioral law and economics
scholars. See infra note 109.
3. For instance, Russell Korobkin uses the argument from irrationality
to found two hard-paternalism proposals. First, Korobkin argues that cognitive limitations of employees in part justify government-mandated health
benefits. See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1999) [hereinafter Korobkin, Managed Care].
Second, he contends that cognitive limitations of consumers justify the inclusion of government-approved mandatory terms in standard form contracts. See
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1243–44, 1255 (2003) [hereinafter
Korobkin, Standard Form Contracts]. Thaler and Sunstein’s “libertarian paternalism,” which emphasizes using default rules to enhance the well-being of
irrational persons, is an example of the softer forms of paternalism being advocated. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism,
93 AM. ECON. REV. 175, 176–78 (2003); see also Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H.
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159,
1167, 1202 (2003). For a discussion of why libertarian paternalism functions
as a “hard” form of paternalism for some persons, see Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1254 (2005).
Rachlinski provides a good review of the numerous proposals advanced on irrationality grounds to restrict individual choice in the market and the lawmaking process. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case
for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1177–1206 (2003). We place hard and
soft paternalism at opposite ends of a continuum measuring degree of choice
censorship or choice constraint, with the intention of keeping blurry the point
at which soft paternalism crosses over into hard paternalism. Our treatment
of hard and soft-paternalism differs from typical treatments of the hard/soft
paternalism distinction, such as that of Gerald Dworkin, who understands
hard paternalism to be sometimes justified “even if the action [to be affected]
is fully voluntary” and understands soft paternalism to be justified only when
the “person for whom we are acting paternalistically is in some way not competent.” Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts, in PATERNALISM 105, 107 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983). Many behavioral law and economics
scholars implicitly adopt a version of the traditional soft paternalism position
that sees irrationality as a justification for intervention, on grounds that a rational person would hypothetically consent to paternalistic measures that
counter irrational decisions: “According to [one] view, ‘respect autonomy’ is
still a side constraint, but one which permits interference if and only if a
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These proposals promise a “benevolent hierarchy”4 in
which central planners substitute their judgments for those of
impulsive, error-prone citizens,5 government agencies aggressively regulate how businesses speak to the masses to prevent
commercial exploitation,6 judges regulate the content of standard form consumer contracts,7 and bureaucrats rather than
jurors make decisions about punitive damages to restore coherence and fairness to the civil litigation system.8 Yet this renewed faith in better lives through paternalistic governance
seems to ignore possible unanticipated effects of such intervention.9 Our intention here is to draw attention to one of the perverse effects likely to follow from enactment of many of the rechoice is irrational and the chooser would consent to the interference if he
were fully rational and well informed.” Danny Scoccia, Paternalism and Respect for Autonomy, 100 ETHICS 318, 318 (1990).
4. Wikler, supra note 1, at 384.
5. See, e.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 3, at 1162 (“[W]e argue for
self-conscious efforts, by private and public institutions, to steer people’s
choices in directions that will improve the choosers’ own welfare.”).
6. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 58 (2003)
(arguing that advertisers’ pervasive efforts and expertise at taking advantage
of consumers’ cognitive biases justifies greater deference to government regulation of commercial speech).
7. See, e.g., Korobkin, Standard Form Contracts, supra note 3, at 1207
(“By recognizing purchasers’ bounded rationality as the most important root
cause of inefficiency in form contracts, courts can modify their use of unconscionability analysis to increase both social welfare generally and buyer welfare specifically.”).
8. See Cass R. Sunstein, What Should Be Done?, in CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET
AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 242, 252–55 (2002) (discussing
removal of the power to award punitive damages from the jury and moving to
a system of civil fines administered by government administrators).
9. Judge Kozinski argues that one of the key lessons learned from the
collectivist experiments in Eastern Europe is that well-intentioned governmental initiatives often backfire. Alex Kozinski, The Dark Lessons of Utopia,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 592–93 (1991) (“[O]ur ability to predict the full effects
of governmental actions—much less the synergistic effects of hundreds of
thousands of simultaneous government interventions—is very limited. Far too
often there are unanticipated results and costs, despite the most careful efforts
of government officials.”). Kozinski’s view echoes Weber’s warning “that the
final result of political activity often, nay, regularly, bears very little relation
to the original intention: often, indeed it is quite the opposite of what was intended.” Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in PRINCETON READINGS IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 499, 501 (Mitchell Cohen & Nicole Fermon eds., 1996), cited
in Frederick W. Preston & Roger I. Roots, Introduction: Law and Its Unintended Consequences, 47 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1371, 1371 (2004). For examples of many laws that have arguably had serious perverse effects, see the recent issue of the American Behavioral Scientist devoted to the unintended
consequences of law, 47 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1371 (2004).
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cent paternalistic proposals, namely, inhibition of the development of the regulated parties’ decision-making skills. Our ideas
have distinguished precursors. Most notably, John Stuart Mill
argued that restraints on behavior should be limited to prevention of harm to others, because broader restraints may adversely affect the development of individuality.10 Alexis de Tocqueville expressed similar sentiments in a more applied context
when he commented on the developmental benefits that accrue
to American women, relative to European women, due to their
increased liberty and exposure to risks.11
The imposition of a paternalistic policy presupposes an individual will act contrary to her best interests unless some

10. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty (1859), in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ES1, 70 (John Gray ed., 1991).
11. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in America (1840), in DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA AND TWO ESSAYS ON AMERICA 1, 684 (Gerald E. Bevan
trans., 2003) (“Long before the young American woman has reached marriageable age, her emancipation from her mother’s supervision has gradually
started . . . . [T]he great scene of society lies constantly exhibited for her to see;
far from attempting to conceal this sight from her, she is daily shown more
and more of it and is taught to contemplate it with a steady and calm gaze.”).
For a modern updating of this view, see Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism as Complementary Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 109, 116 (2001) (noting that
“some forms of sexism are, for the perpetrator, subjectively benevolent, characterizing women as pure creatures who ought to be protected, supported, and
adored and whose love is necessary to make a man complete”). Within legal
scholarship, Winick has consistently expressed a Millian concern about paternalism’s effects on individual development and health. See Bruce J. Winick,
Coercion and Mental Health Treatment, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1145, 1160
(1997); Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives,
37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1764 (1992). Also, in an earlier paper one of the present
authors raised the moral hazard concern that is developed more fully here. See
Jonathan Klick, The Microfoundations of Standard Form Contracts: Price Discrimination vs. Behavioral Bias, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555, 569 (2005).
With respect specifically to governance proposals generated through behavioral economics, to date scholars have primarily warned about the perverse
effect that may arise from eliminating one cognitive bias that serves to temper
another cognitive bias, that is, the possible upsetting of offsetting biases if
government attempts to counter biases one by one without considering the interactive effects of biases. See, e.g., Jonathan Baron, Cognitive Biases, Cognitive Limits, and Risk Communication, 23 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 7, 11
(2004) (“[B]iases may work together to restore a kind of artificial equilibrium
that works for normal situations, so that correcting one bias without correcting another one can make things worse.”); see also Gregory Besharov, SecondBest Considerations in Correcting Cognitive Biases, 71 SO. ECON. J. 12, 19
(2004). We agree that this potential perverse effect is a serious concern, but it
is not the only unintended consequence that may arise from government regulation of irrationality.
SAYS
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third party intervenes to protect those interests.12 Such intervention may be justified on grounds that the paternalism advances efficiency, personal integrity, or sound judgment.13 For
simplicity’s sake we focus here on the goal of the new paternalism to correct inefficiencies associated with systematic psychological biases in the formation of beliefs and expression of preferences,14 but our analysis also has implications for the
personal-integrity and sound-judgment rationales for paternalism.15
We question the generality of the claim that short-run inef-

12. See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107,
108 (Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., 1971) (characterizing paternalism as “the
interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced”); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 763 (1983) (“In general, any legal rule that prohibits
an action on the ground that it would be contrary to the actor’s own welfare is
paternalistic.”). We recognize the difficulties associated with defining paternalism, see, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability
Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 211 (2000) (“[T]he
literature on paternalism contains a variety of explicit and implicit conceptions of paternalism.”), and we recognize that some may claim that government regulation of irrationality is not paternalistic. Nevertheless, we are interested in whether government regulation of irrationality reliably achieves
the goal of efficiency, whether that goal can rightly be labeled paternalistic or
not.
13. See Kronman, supra note 12, at 765 (noting that some paternalistic
regulations “are best explained by considerations of economic efficiency and
distributive fairness, others by the idea of personal integrity, and a third set of
limitations by the . . . notion of sound judgment”).
14. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First
Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 645 (2004) (”[U]nder some circumstances paternalism can be efficient, especially where people’s preferences are
irrational. Still others, pointing to the limits of individual human reason and
the frequency of market failure, see broad areas where it is legitimate” (footnotes omitted)).
15. For instance, the notion behind the personal-integrity justification is
that paternalistic intervention constitutes no invasion of personal integrity
when it disrupts lowly ranked concerns to protect highly ranked concerns. See
JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 68 (1984). But if paternalism interferes with the
life-long developmental processes needed to distinguish lowly ranked from
highly ranked values and then to pursue higher values, then the personalintegrity justification loses some of its force. The difficulty, of course, is distinguishing between those freedoms that are vital to developing personal integrity and those that will impede development. Perhaps the best case can be
made for restricting minors’ access to addictive goods that pose serious health
risks. Lowenstein, for instance, argues that smoking has developmental costs
that surely outweigh the benefits of protecting cigarette advertisements aimed
at children. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much Puff ”: Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1212–13 (1988).
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ficiencies associated with psychological biases justify paternalistic government regulations.16 In particular, we argue that
there will often be long-run costs of paternalistic regulations
that offset short-run gains because of the negative learning and
motivational effects of paternalistic regulations. An appreciation of the role of learning and motivation in the development
of rational behavior, and the necessary concomitant that individuals differ in their propensities to act rationally, suggests
two broad limitations on the force and scope of irrationalitybased arguments for paternalism. First, individual and situ-

16. For instance, Korobkin expressly argues that psychological biases lead
to inefficiencies that can be corrected with paternalistic interventions. See
Korobkin, Managed Care, supra note 3, at 88; Korobkin, Standard Form Contracts, supra note 3, at 1294 (“The design of non-salient terms is better assigned to government institutions because the market will not create pressure
toward efficiency and state actors, as imperfect as they will be, at least can
aim at the proper target.”).
Within legal scholarship, Zamir argues most generally that paternalistic
legal rules will be economically efficient if the citizenry is assumed to be
boundedly rational. See Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L.
REV. 229, 252 (1998) (“Once the prevalence of systematic deviations from the
rational-maximizer model is acknowledged, principled antipaternalism is no
longer a tenable position of economic analysis.”). The primary difference between Zamir’s model and our analysis is that we effectively endogenize the
magnitude of the cognitive bias under which an individual makes her decisions. That is, while Zamir assumes that the likelihood of an individual choosing correctly is given, we explicitly model the individual’s choice of how much
cognitive effort to expend and that effort in turn determines the individual’s
likelihood of choosing correctly. In terms of evaluating the ultimate welfare
implications of a particular paternalistic intervention, our model implies that
the relevant comparison does not just involve comparing which decision maker
(individual or paternalist) is more likely to choose correctly as in Zamir’s
model; it also involves comparing the cost of improving an individual’s likelihood of choosing correctly with the cost of administering the paternalistic intervention. In addition, whereas Zamir recognizes but discounts the possible
long-term effects of paternalism, largely on grounds that cognitive biases are
ubiquitous and persistent, see id. at 276–77, we believe that growing evidence
of the situation- and person-dependent nature of rationality errors and the realization that the heuristic and bias research is not as robust as previously
thought, counsel greater concern for the developmental and incentive effects of
paternalism. See, e.g., Mandeep K. Dhami et al., The Role of Representative
Design in an Ecological Approach to Cognition, 130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 959, 976
(2004) (“[R]esearch in the heuristics-and-biases program involves carefully
setting up conditions that produce cognitive biases. The extent to which these
findings generalize to conditions outside the laboratory is unclear.” (citations
omitted)); David R. Shanks et al., A Re-examination of Probability Matching
and Rational Choice, 15 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 233, 248 (2002) (noting
that probability matching “is heavily context-dependent and . . . can be made
to disappear under appropriate conditions of task structure, training, motivation, and feedback”).
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ational variation in irrational tendencies will often make debiasing interventions, or no intervention at all, more efficient
than paternalistic interventions. Second, paternalistic interventions may exacerbate irrational tendencies by creating
moral and cognitive hazards. Moral hazards arise because paternalistic regulations reduce an individual’s motivation to act
deliberately and carefully, and motivation level mediates many
psychological biases. What we term “cognitive hazards” arise
when paternalistic regulations interfere with information
searches, educational investments, and feedback that would occur in the absence of paternalistic interventions and that are
important to the individual’s development of effective decisionmaking skills and strategies.17
Our cautionary argument regarding paternalistic interventions follows from psychological research on judgment and decision making and economic modeling of decision-making behavior under a paternalistic regime. In Part I, we provide a
theoretical and empirical justification for the moral and cognitive hazards of paternalism utilizing two bodies of psychological
research that have been largely ignored by behavioral law and
economics scholars. First, research from developmental psychology indicates that individuals improve their decisionmaking skills over time through a “learning by doing” process,
and that paternalistic policies threaten interference in this selfregulatory process.18 Second, research on self-fulfilling prophe17. Within judgment and decision-making studies it is often difficult to
separate motivational from cognitive determinants of behavior, see, e.g., Norbert Schwarz, Social Judgment and Attitudes: Warmer, More Social, and Less
Conscious, 30 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149, 159–60 (2000), but generally motivated processing is conceived of as goal-directed thought aimed at protecting
one’s self-image or existing beliefs or achieving accuracy, whereas cognitive
processing simply refers to the operation of information-processing mechanisms without any particular directional or self-serving goal presumed. See,
e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480,
495 (1990) (“Although the mechanisms underlying motivated reasoning are
not yet fully understood, it is now clear that directional goals do affect reasoning.”). For our purposes, we need only distinguish between hazards associated
with changes in motives to engage in effortful, analytic thought in the present
which is more likely to lead to rational behavior (i.e., moral hazards), and hazards associated with changes in the amount of information learned (i.e., cognitive hazards). Both hazards may result from paternalistic intervention and
cause long-run inefficiencies, although through different mechanisms. For discussion of the relation between cognitive and moral hazard in economic terms,
see infra note 79.
18. Cf. Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 1214 (“The role of individual learning
and adaptation . . . cannot be ignored in assessing the need for paternalism.
Simple experience might, in some contexts, be a much better cure for cognitive
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cies warns that regulated parties are likely to become the weak
decision makers envisioned by paternalistic policy makers, as
paternalistic regulations undercut personal incentives to invest
in cognitive capital and the regulated parties conform to the
expectancies of the paternalist.19
In Part II, we develop economic models of behavior under
paternalism that further support the view that paternalism
may lead to suboptimal long-run behavior. These models specify when paternalistic accommodation of irrational tendencies
is warranted, when education or another debiasing approach to
irrational tendencies is warranted, and when no governmental
action is warranted. In Part III, using insights from our economic models of behavior under paternalism, we discuss the
factors that should be considered when designing paternalistic
interventions in order to limit the cognitive and moral hazards
of paternalism. We also note the woefully inadequate state of
empirical knowledge relevant to these factors and hence the
great likelihood that many paternalistic interventions are
suboptimal.
I. JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
UNDER PATERNALISM
A. A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON DECISION-MAKING
COMPETENCE
Contrary to the static approaches to judgment and decision
making that underlie most behavioral law and economics understandings of irrationality and concomitant calls for paternalism to counter irrational behaviors,20 we consider how pamissteps than adopting a paternalist intervention.”).
19. Cf. Jon Elster, Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF INTEREST
44, 47 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (“[T]he opportunity to choose—including
the right to make the wrong choices—is a valuable, in fact, indispensable,
means to self-improvement.”); Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public
Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 52 (1995)
(“Many psychologists (and historians too) have noticed a tendency for individuals and groups to take on the characteristics that others, particularly
those in positions of authority, ascribe to them—what is known in the psychological literature as a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy.’”).
20. Behavioral law and economics scholars often catalog the many psychological biases that have been demonstrated by psychologists and behavioral
economists, typically in laboratory experiments or through classroom surveys
using word problems, and then use this assortment of biases to justify a particular approach to legal regulation. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2,
at 633–34; Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1476–77; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note
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ternalistic regulations may affect cognitive behavior over time
both inside and outside the regulated domain.21 Before introducing our economic models of behavior under paternalism, we
introduce the psychological framework and empirical findings
that motivate these models. Of particular importance are
Byrnes’s self-regulation model of decision making22 and evidence for the role of incentives and personal motivation as mediators of rational action.

2, at 1058. These menu or snapshot approaches to judgment and decision
making focus on how a particular legal judgment or decision might fall prey to
one or more biases. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 2, at 1096–97. Behavioral law and economics’ static approach to judgment and decision making
is largely a function of behavioral decision theory’s lack of an integrative theory. Id. at 1057. The dominant research program within behavioral decision
theory, the heuristics and biases program, consists of a collection of robust
empirical findings bound together by high-level concepts rather than an integrative theory that can predict how particular features of the mind and environment are likely to interact in particular cases (e.g., the heuristics and biases program predicts that accessible features of the environment and memory
will exert inordinate influence on judgments, but it lacks a theory of accessibility). See, e.g., Michael R.P. Dougherty et al., Memory as a Fundamental Heuristic for Decision Making, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND
DECISION RESEARCH 125, 128 (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau eds.,
2003); Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping
Bounded Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 697, 702 (2003) (“[M]uch is known
about the determinants of accessibility, but there is no general theoretical account of accessibility and no prospect of one emerging soon.”). For an internal
critique of psychology’s emphasis on demonstrating judgment and decisionmaking shortcomings, see Joachim I. Krueger & David C. Funder, Towards a
Balanced Social Psychology: Causes, Consequences and Cures for the ProblemSeeking Approach to Social Behavior and Cognition, 27 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI.
313 (2004).
21. Brehmer notes that research limiting itself to “snapshots of judgmental processes” is
an important line of research, for there are undoubtedly situations in
which momentary accuracy is important. However, to an organism
behaving in time, momentary accuracy may be less important. It is
only necessary that the momentary level of achievement is sufficient
to point the organism in the right direction, for there are always possibilities for later corrections. It does not seem unlikely that such
“cognition over time” is the natural form of cognition. If so, the levels
of achievement that are found in “snapshot studies” of judgment and
decision making are neither surprising nor alarming. It certainly
gives an answer to the puzzle of how organisms have survived despite
their seemingly inefficient cognitive equipment.
Berndt Brehmer, Man as a Stabiliser of Systems: From Static Snapshots of
Judgment Processes to Dynamic Decision Making, 2 THINKING & REASONING
225, 226 (1996) (citations omitted).
22. JAMES P. BYRNES, THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF DECISION
MAKING: A SELF-REGULATION MODEL (1998) (proposing and introducing the
self-regulation model of decision making).
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Byrnes’s self-regulation model assumes that “[t]he key to
being successful in life is knowing the difference between options that are likely to produce favorable outcomes and options
that are unlikely to produce favorable outcomes.”23 Through
education, experimentation, experience, and observation, individuals learn which options are most likely to produce desirable
outcomes and develop competence in the ability to compile and
rank-order options, and then select the option that will lead to
the most favorable outcome.24 The main vehicle to greater decision-making competence is alteration in existing psychological
states such that later psychological states possess more reliable
knowledge about what ends are most valued and how best to
achieve those ends.25 Outcome feedback and verbal feedback
serve as the main mechanisms for change between earlier and
later psychological states.26
23. James P. Byrnes, The Development of Decision-Making, 31 J. ADOLESHEALTH 208, 208 (2002); see also James P. Byrnes et al., Learning to
Make Good Decisions: A Self-Regulation Perspective, 70 CHILD DEV. 1121,
1121 (1999) (“[T]here should be a close correspondence between effective decision-making and personal success.”). Hence, Byrnes effectively employs a
means-end or instrumental account of rationality that is consistent with weak
microeconomic conceptions of rationality and efficiency.
24. Byrnes breaks the decision process down into four steps: (1) setting a
goal, (2) compiling options to achieve the goal, (3) rank-ordering the options,
and (4) selecting the highest-ranked option. Byrnes et al., supra note 22, at
1121. Direct involvement in a task is not the sole route to learning; observing
others perform the task may lead to one’s own improvement on the task or
lead to adaptive avoidance of the task altogether (e.g., observing other day
traders fail may wisely lead one to avoid day trading entirely). See Nigel Harvey & Ilan Fischer, Development of Experience-Based Judgment and Decision
Making: The Role of Outcome Feedback, in THE ROUTINES OF DECISION MAKING 119, 134–35 (Tilman Betsch & Susanne Haberstroh eds., 2005).
25. See Byrnes et al., supra note 23, at 1122–23.
26. See id. at 1122. Outcome feedback refers to success or failure of a chosen option; verbal feedback refers to “commentary or advice given before or
after choices are made.” Id. The relatively few studies that have empirically
examined the role of feedback in adult decision making suggest that adults
can “progressively learn to make better decisions if they receive[ ] relatively
clear feedback from outcomes.” Id. at 1125 (citations omitted). Although verbal, or cognitive, feedback has often been shown to lead to greater learning
than outcome feedback, Byrnes, Miller, and Reynolds report empirical results
showing that “outcome feedback was more effective than verbal feedback” to
effect positive change in choice behavior. Byrnes et al., supra note 23, at 1137.
Compare William K. Balzer et al., Effects of Cognitive Feedback on Performance, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 410, 410 (1989) (“In contrast to [outcome feedback],
[cognitive feedback] has been found to improve the accuracy of judgments in
many circumstances.”) with Byrnes et al., supra note 23, at 1137. For a review
of the impact of outcome feedback on various types of judgments and decisions,
see generally Harvey & Fischer, supra note 24.
CENT
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The self-regulation model is not exclusively behaviorist in
its orientation, however, as it posits an “endogenous tendency
toward self-regulation” that keeps one oriented “toward increased accuracy in the face of occasional instances of success
and failure that could lead it astray” (i.e., a model that controls
for random disturbances in the system).27 This self-regulation
tendency, which is presumed to operate through the long-term
memory system, leads to conservatism in the changes made between earlier and later psychological states that are relevant to
decision-making success.28 Thus, individual instances of success or failure, unless accompanied by verbal feedback, may result in few changes in psychological states due to this conservatism, but repeated instances of outcome feedback within a
particular domain or with a particular task or goal that cuts
across domains are likely to lead to changes in psychological
states.29
27. Byrnes et al., supra note 23, at 1122.
28. See id. at 1122–23 (“Conservative belief change is highly adaptive in
an uncertain and variable environment.”). Gibson and colleagues offer a parallel process model of learning in dynamic decision environments that can explain gradual learning and generalization from feedback. See Faison P. Gibson
et al., Learning in Dynamic Decision Tasks: Computational Model and Empirical Evidence, 71 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1
(1997). One can also view the learning process as a reinforcement model,
which also leads to gradual change. See Eric Von Magnus, Preference, Rationality, and Risk Taking, 94 ETHICS 637, 639–40 (1984).
29. Support for this conclusion is found in laboratory studies of markets,
where choices in experimental repetitive markets often converge toward the
rational choice equilibrium. See Vernon L. Smith, Economics in the Laboratory, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 118 (1994) (noting a “tendency for rational behavior to emerge in the context of a repetitive market institution” and that “[i]n
many experimental markets, . . . human agents interact through the trading
rules to produce social algorithms which demonstrably approximate the
wealth maximizing outcomes traditionally thought to require complete information and cognitively rational actors” (footnote omitted)); see also Colin
Camerer et al., The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1232, 1242 (1989) (noting, with respect to the
“curse of knowledge,” or the negative effects of asymmetric information, that
“[m]arket experience clearly reduces bias more than individual judgment tempered by incentives and feedback”). In addition, Gervais and Odean provide a
dynamic model of overconfidence in trading that supports the self-regulation
model of decision making:
When a trader is successful, he attributes too much of his success to
his own ability and revises his beliefs about his ability upward too
much. In our model overconfidence is dynamic, changing with successes and failures. Average levels of overconfidence are greatest in
those who have been trading for a short time. With more experience,
people develop better self-assessments.
Simon Gervais & Terrance Odean, Learning to Be Overconfident, 14 REV. FIN.
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It is also important to emphasize that the self-regulation
model, because it incorporates cognitive components, allows for
both domain-specific and domain-general learning, though the
presumption is that domain-specific learning is more common.30 Learning may thus take the form of increases in the accuracy of one’s beliefs in a particular domain or development of
domain-general theories about the relationship of higher-order
goals and procedures for achieving those goals.31 For instance,
developing effective self-control techniques in order to save for
an automobile or home may generalize to effective strategies
for retirement saving. Or, as demonstrated by empirical research on the endowment effect, people may learn to overcome
consumer biases with greater market experience, and this
learning may generalize across goods.32 Calibration of beliefs
may involve improved self-knowledge, particularly with respect
to likes and dislikes and consumption tendencies, and not sim-

STUD. 1, 19 (2001). Gervais and Odean also note that empirical data are consistent with this dynamic model of overconfident trading. See id. (“[Y]ounger
investors trade more actively than older investors while earning lower returns
relative to a buy-and-hold portfolio. These results are consistent with our prediction that overconfidence diminishes with greater experience.”). Bjorklund
argues more generally that immaturity in one’s metacognition (i.e., knowledge
about the workings of one’s own mind) has positive effects on physical and
cognitive development, because such immaturity leads to exploratory behavior
and learning that would not occur in a person with a more mature metacognitive state and a better-calibrated confidence level with respect to her abilities.
See David F. Bjorklund, The Role of Immaturity in Human Development, 122
PSYCHOL. BULL. 153, 163–66 (1997). Thus, overconfidence provides adaptive
benefits that, in the long run, outweigh any initial, short-run costs.
30. See Byrnes et al., supra note 23, at 1124. Thus, learning should occur
more quickly in repetitive decision settings, such as with many consumer
goods, but learning may also generalize across goods and decision settings.
31. The precise ways in which domain-specific and domain-general knowledge structures change are not important to our treatment. Dougherty and his
colleagues offer an account of how experience and domain knowledge may progressively lead to reduced error. See Dougherty et al., supra note 20, at 144–
51. Note, however, that much of the learning that takes place will be in the
form of “tacit knowledge” rather than “academic intelligence.” “Tacit knowledge refers to general and domain specific skills and abilities acquired over
time. It is possible that an individual may absorb these skills and abilities
through experience rather than through formal education and training.”
James E. Hunton & Ruth Ann McEwen, An Assessment of the Relation Between Analysts’ Earning Forecast Accuracy, Motivational Incentives and Cognitive Information Search Strategy, 72 ACCT. REV. 497, 514 (1997) (citations
omitted).
32. See John A. List, Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615, 624 (2004).
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ply knowledge about causal relations in the external world.33 In
addition, learning will take the form of discovering when external resources should be recruited to overcome internal resource
limitations, such as knowing when to consult experts or gain
explicit education in a domain.34
The self-regulation model has obvious implications for
hard-paternalism proposals that restrict choice and opportunities: feedback and learning cannot occur if “institutional and
other structures essentially rule out the possibility of experiencing feedback that might be contrary to one’s beliefs.”35 To
the extent that government is more likely to intervene paternalistically on important choices, paternalistic constraints on
learning are likely to be significant in such cases because more
important decisions elicit more effortful evaluation processing
than less important decisions.36
Softer forms of paternalism may also adversely affect
learning by altering the individual’s representation of the
choice setting and how she encodes feedback about success or
failure in a given situation.37 The individual does not exert the
same level of control in compiling and assessing options in the
presence of soft paternalism, and verbal feedback about even a
soft paternalistic situation should cause the individual to discount her own role in achieving a particular outcome.38

33. See Byrnes, supra note 23, at 210 (“[T]here is an important, but relatively ignored, aspect of knowledge that might prove to produce consistent age
differences in choices: self-knowledge.”).
34. See id. at 209 (“[C]ompetent decision-makers use strategies to overcome obstacles that might hinder the discovery process. For example, they
might seek advice from knowledgeable people when they are not sure how to
proceed . . . .”); see also Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 1219 (“Often, even if people employ a suboptimal strategy and cannot adapt, they can recognize their
own limitations and hire others to help them make decisions.”).
35. Byrnes et al., supra note 23, at 1123 (citation omitted).
36. Byrnes, supra note 23, at 211 (“Studies show that adults are likely to
alternate between effortful and less effortful evaluation strategies depending
of [sic] the importance of a decision.” (citation omitted)).
37. In addition, some seemingly soft forms of paternalism may effectively
operate as hard forms of paternalism. See Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1248 (noting that “libertarian paternalism is an oxymoron”).
38. It is possible, however, that a self-serving attributional bias will inhibit the discounting effect that should occur with respect to positive feedback
in a soft-paternalism situation. See Amy H. Mezulis et al., Is There a Universal Positivity Bias in Attributions? A Meta-Analytic Review of Individual, Developmental, and Cultural Differences in the Self-Serving Attributional Bias,
130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 711, 738 (2004) (“We found strong support for the existence of a robust self-serving bias in attributions.”).
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From this consideration of self-regulatory processes in decision making, three propositions may be extracted: (1) paternalistic policies that restrict choice options restrict learning opportunities; (2) the noisier the learning environment, the more
difficult to learn, and paternalistic policies introduce noise into,
or mute feedback signals in, the learning environment;39 (3) the
more extensive the paternalism imposed on citizens, the
greater the cognitive hazard, due to restricted learning opportunities and more noise in learning environments.
This dynamic approach to decision making and the effects
of paternalism finds further support in the renewed appreciation of the role that incentives play in the rationality of judgment and decision making. Contrary to some suggestions otherwise within behavioral law and economics, material
incentives do improve the quality of choice under certain conditions:
Incentives improve performance in easy tasks that are effort responsive, like judgment, prediction, problem-solving, recalling items from
memory, or clerical tasks. Incentives sometimes hurt when problems
are too difficult or when simple intuition or habit provides an optimal
answer and thinking harder makes things worse. In games, auctions,
and risky choices the most typical result is that incentives do not affect mean performance, but incentives often reduce variance in responses. In situations where there is no clear standard of performance, incentives often cause subjects to move away from favorable
“self-presentation” behavior toward more realistic choices.40

39. As the feedback structure becomes more complex, individuals have a
harder time making effective use of feedback. See Brehmer, supra note 21, at
234–36. However, to the extent that feedback about task information, or information about the relation between environmental cues and the true state of
the object or criterion to be judged, is available, some learning may occur even
in more complex environments. See William K. Balzer et al., Effects of Cognitive Feedback Components, Display Format, and Elaboration on Performance,
58 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 369, 382 (1994)
(“[I]t is the [task information] component of [cognitive feedback] (i.e., telling
judges the correct strategy for weighting and integrating information to optimize their judgments) that is essential for improving judgment performance.”).
40. Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 34 (1999); see also Vernon L. Smith, Method in Experiment: Rhetoric and Reality, 5 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 91, 101–02 (2002)
(“Anyone who doubts that payoffs can and do matter has not looked at the evidence. What is not predictable by any theory is what situations will be sensitive at what payoff levels and what situations will not be sensitive at the levels commonly used.”). In addition, cognitive behavior under conditions of low
material payoffs or hypothetical payoffs may differ significantly from behavior
in response to economic situations with significant real consequences, such
that it becomes risky to assume bias in low-cost situations will manifest itself
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Incentives play an important role in the quality of judgment and choice even if we take the most restrictive view of the
positive effects of incentives—namely, that incentives move behavior toward the rational response only in cases where a
dominant or clear normative response exists or where irrational behavior occurs due to lack of attention or interest.41 Incentives remain important under even this restrictive view because several psychological biases arise from inattention or
insufficient motivation to engage in information search, and
thus the incidence and severity of these biases are conditional
on incentive levels.42
identically in high-cost situations. See Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury,
Varying the Scale of Financial Incentives Under Real and Hypothetical Conditions, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 417, 418 (2001); see also James F. Smith &
Thomas Kida, Heuristics and Biases: Expertise and Task Realism in Auditing,
109 PSYCHOL. BULL. 472, 486 (1991) (“For many audit judgments, the costs
associated with certain risks are sufficiently large that they seem to significantly influence the nature of audit training and formalized audit procedures.”).
41. See Dan N. Stone & David A. Ziebart, A Model of Financial Incentive
Effects in Decision Making, 61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 250, 259 (1995) (“[I]ncentives appear to increase the extent of attention given to a task, but also to increase potentially distracting emotions . . . .”). A slightly less-restrictive view is that for some biases that involve
more than lack of interest or inattentiveness incentives will be effective only
for those people who possess the cognitive capacity or ability to compute the
rational solution. See, e.g., Vidya Awasthi & Jamie Pratt, The Effects of Monetary Incentives on Effort and Decision Performance: The Role of Cognitive
Characteristics, 65 ACCT. REV. 797, 808 (1990) (reporting that monetary incentives improved the performance of subjects with higher perceptual differentiation ability (i.e., the ability to abstract familiar concepts or relationships from
a complex setting) with respect to application of the conjunction probability
and sample size rules). An even less restrictive view of incentives would argue
for the positive effects of incentives on decision avoidance, use of decision aids,
and recruitment of expert assistance. This view remains untested within
judgment and decision-making research because this research rarely presents
these options to subjects, but instead examines how subjects’ own, unassisted
performance on rational-thinking tests is affected by incentives.
42. Frey and Eichenberger note that positive incentive effects have been
found with respect to numerous anomalies, including preference reversals, the
Allais paradox, the certainty effect, ambiguity aversion, deviations between
willingness-to-pay prices and willingness-to-accept prices, base rate neglect,
overoptimism, anchoring, the hindsight bias, temporal inconsistencies, and
framing effects. See Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, Economic Incentives Transform Psychological Anomalies, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 215, 225
n.16 (1994); see also Ralph Hertwig & Andreas Ortmann, Experimental Practices in Economics: A Methodological Challenge for Psychologists?, 24 BEHAV.
& BRAIN SCI. 383, 391–96 (2001) (surveying a variety of studies in which incentives positively affected performance). Engelmann and Strobel, in a study
of the false consensus effect, show how incentives can improve information
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In addition to direct material incentives, holding people accountable for their judgments and decisions can likewise move
behavior toward the rational norm.43 “Predecisional accountability to an unknown audience will attenuate biases that arise
from lack of self-critical attention to one’s decision processes
and failure to use all relevant cues.”44 Thus, expecting to have
to account for a choice may have positive effects on decisionmaking quality.45
A direct linkage exists between incentives and selfregulation: incentives often motivate a decision maker to invest
cognitive effort and other resources to achieve a goal, with the
positive by-product of increased procedural and self-knowledge
even in cases of outcome failure. That is, the self-regulation

search and belief formation. See Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, The False
Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given, 3 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 241, 253 (2000) (“[G]iven both
these incentives and representative information, although subjects show a
consensus effect, they show no false consensus effect.”). Based on these results,
Engelmann and Strobel note that “the false consensus effect might not be very
relevant for economic applications.” Id. Incentive effects may also be understood within a dual-process model of cognition: to the extent incentives encourage shifts from intuitive to deliberative thinking, those biases that can be
reduced by more effortful, deliberative thought should be positively affected by
increasing incentives. Cf. Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Who Uses
Base Rates and P(D/~H)? An Analysis of Individual Differences, 26 MEMORY
& COGNITION 161, 166–69, 171, 175–76 (1998) (reporting significant correlations between propensity to engage in more deliberative thought and positive
performance tests of cognitive ability, deductive reasoning ability, and inductive reasoning ability). Combining market forces with incentives provides even
more potent debiasing force. See, e.g., David M. Grether, Individual Behavior
and Market Performance, 76 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1079, 1079–82 (1994) (discussing the role of incentives and markets in reducing the incidence and effects of the representativeness heuristic, preference reversals, and the endowment effect).
43. The particular contours of the accountability constraint are important:
Self-critical and effortful thinking is most likely to be activated when
decision makers learn prior to forming any opinions that they will be
accountable to an audience (a) whose views are unknown, (b) who is
interested in accuracy, (c) who is interested in processes rather than
specific outcomes, (d) who is reasonably well-informed, and (e) who
has a legitimate reason for inquiring into the reasons behind participants’ judgments.
Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 259 (1999).
44. Id. at 265.
45. Accountability may, however, exacerbate bias “to the extent that (a) a
given judgment bias results from using normatively (but not obviously) proscribed information or (b) a given choice bias results from the fact that the option appears easiest to justify also happens to be the biased option.” Id.
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model of decision making emphasizes that the decision maker
may benefit from even bad or unlucky choices. Indeed, learning
may be greatest in response to negative or unfavorable outcomes.46 Thus, removing incentives to make good decisions may
negatively impact activity levels and the amount of cognitive
resources invested in activities, causing reductions in the
amount and kinds of procedural- and self-knowledge gained.
In considering the motivational effects of paternalism, it is
useful to distinguish between paternalism imposed before and
after a choice is made (i.e., ex ante versus ex post paternalism).47 Ex ante paternalism reduces the incentive to search for
information, carefully evaluate decision options, or develop
good decision-making strategies. Ex post paternalism reduces
the risk of thoughtless action, because the government will insulate the decision maker from the consequences of the
thoughtless choice. Thus, ex post paternalism operates as a
form of social insurance for irrational behavior.48

46. See, e.g., Peter H. Ditto et al., Motivated Sensitivity to PreferenceInconsistent Information, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 64 (1998)
(reporting the results of three studies showing that preference-inconsistent
feedback motivated more effortful processing and a greater sensitivity to information quality than preference-consistent feedback); id. at 54 (“A large
body of research in social cognition suggests that negative information and
negative affective states produce more systematic, detail-oriented cognitive
processing than positive information and positive affective states.” (citations
omitted)); Dan Zakay et al., Outcome Value and Early Warning Indications as
Determinants of Willingness to Learn from Experience, 51 EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 150, 155 (2004).
47. Ex ante paternalism eliminates or reduces contractual freedom before
a transaction occurs, including the imposition of cooling-off periods and information-disclosure requirements. Bankruptcy protection and unconscionability
challenges to contractual validity are the classic forms of ex post paternalism
(recognizing, of course, that nonpaternalistic justifications may also be offered
for both bankruptcy and the unconscionability doctrine), but the behavioral
law and economics literature has given rise to new claims for judicial relief.
See Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 888 (N.D.
Ill. 2000) (noting that plaintiffs filed a claim for race discrimination in housing
sales that relied on a theory of market manipulation via exploitation of psychological bias as advanced by Hanson and Kysar).
48. Under some accounts of paternalism, if a party seeks state assistance
for relief from a contract, as through an assertion of the unconscionability doctrine, then a court’s invalidation of the contract would not be a paternalistic
act. See Shiffrin, supra note 12, at 210–11 Although it is not necessary to believe that an act of paternalism must be against the will of the assisted party,
we need not resolve this issue here (for a discussion of the various paternalism
issues raised by the unconscionability doctrine, see Shiffrin, supra note 12).
For our purposes, ex post paternalism is simply shorthand for government assistance available to protect a party from an earlier, supposedly irrational act.
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We may therefore add two propositions that reflect the
possibility that decision competence will be endogenous to the
incentives created by a paternalistic policy: (4) ex ante paternalism provides a negative incentive to invest in cognitive capital and exert cognitive effort, which may have adverse effects
both inside and outside the regulated domain; (5) ex post paternalism provides a positive incentive to reduce cognitive effort and care in many domains. These propositions emphasize
that paternalistic policies, on the margin, reduce an individual’s incentive to cultivate her cognitive capacity. That is, while
a social planner may still determine that paternalism raises social welfare by some measure, one of the costs that must be
considered is that biases themselves may be worsened or prolonged by the paternalistic policies.
To be clear, we do not contend that Byrnes’s self-regulation
model removes all concern about individual instances of poor
judgment or choice,49 or that the self-regulation model provides
a compelling argument against all paternalistic proposals.
Rather, this empirically derived model highlights key processes
in the development of decision-making competence that may be
adversely affected by paternalistic policies, and it directs attention away from a static or piecemeal approach to judgment and
decision making.50 Byrnes’s model stands out because it is one
of the few attempts to integrate developmental research into
the literature on judgment and decision making, despite the
long-standing recognition of the importance of learning to cognitive competence.51
49. Nor does Byrnes. Byrnes treats processing biases, including those
arising from heuristics, as moderating factors that prevent optimal use of resources or distract from goal attainment. See Byrnes, supra note 23, at 212.
50. Evidence that market experience reduces the incidence of some irrational behaviors further supports this dynamic approach to judgment and decision making. See, e.g., John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.J. ECON. 41, 70 (2003) (finding “strong evidence that
individual behavior converges to the neoclassical prediction as trading experience intensifies”).
51. Einhorn noted long ago the crucial relation of outcome feedback to decision quality:
A major variable in understanding heuristics is outcome feedback.
Since outcome feedback is the main source of information for evaluating the quality of our decision/judgment rules, knowledge of how task
variables both affect outcomes and influence the way outcomes are
coded and stored in memory becomes critical in explaining how heuristics are learned and used.
Hillel J. Einhorn, Learning From Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Decision Making, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 268,
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Also, we do not assume that all individuals exhibit the
same potential for self-regulation of their decision making nor
exhibit the same sensitivity to motivational effects on their rational behavior.52 As Byrnes notes, several personality traits
serve to amplify or moderate the development of self-regulated
decision making,53 and individuals learn at different rates.54
However, in light of the growing empirical evidence that individuals differ in their ability to achieve high levels of decision
competence,55 we believe it defensible to assume that individuals differ in their potential for self-regulation and to argue that,
at the margin, paternalistic policies will interfere with the development of decision-making competence.
B. THE AUTOGENETIC EFFECTS OF PATERNALISM
Acting paternalistically toward a particular group, on

269 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). Reyna and Brainerd’s fuzzy-trace
theory offers another important developmental perspective on judgment and
decision making. See Valerie F. Reyna et al., Memory, Development, and Rationality: An Integrative Theory of Judgment and Decision Making, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH, supra note 20, at
201, 201; see also Judite V. Kokis et al., Heuristic and Analytic Processing: Age
Trends and Associations With Cognitive Ability and Cognitive Styles, 83 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 26 (2002) (describing the alternative dualprocess approach to cognitive development).
52. A particularly important mediating variable is likely to be the individual’s cognitive disposition, which encompasses the more flexible and malleable aspects of cognition (e.g., the disposition to weigh the opinions of others
before forming a decision and the amount of time and effort expended to resolve decision-making problems) and which may be contrasted with cognitive
capacity and the fairly stable and mechanical aspects of cognition (e.g., working memory capacity, perceptual speed). See, e.g., KEITH E. STANOVICH, WHO
IS RATIONAL? STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN REASONING 157 (1999)
(describing cognitive disposition as the “psychological mechanisms and strategies that tend to generate characteristic behavioral tendencies and tactics” (citation omitted)). A person with low cognitive capacity but who is disposed to
exert greater time and effort to the resolution of decisional problems may
achieve results equal to or better than those achieved by persons with greater
cognitive capacity.
53. See, e.g., Byrnes et al., supra note 23, at 1123 (emphasizing the moderating effects of dogmatism and impulsivity).
54. See BYRNES, supra note 22, at 116 (“[S]elf-regulation is arrayed along
a continuum ranging from complete dysregulation to complete self-regulation.
Most of us fall somewhere in the middle of the continuum.”).
55. See Andrew M. Parker & Baruch Fischhoff, Decision-Making Competence: External Validation Through an Individual-Differences Approach, 18 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 21 (2005) (validating a measure of individual differences in decision-making competence). See generally STANOVICH, supra note
52 (demonstrating that individual differences implicate rationality).
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grounds that the group is at risk of making irrational and inefficient decisions, is likely to have autogenetic consequences.56
First, the paternalist takes steps to restrict the contractual
freedom of the regulated parties in the belief that the regulated
parties lack full decision-making competence, Yet such contractual freedom is needed to develop competence in decision making, as suggested above in our discussion of the self-regulation
model of decision making. Thus, restriction of freedom to contract is likely to reinforce the need for paternalistic oversight in
the regulated domain and other domains.57 The perception of
irrationality in the general public likewise leads to selffulfilling behaviors within the paternalist himself, such as interpreting ambiguous evidence as evidence of irrational consumer behavior or engaging in strict review of disconfirming
data and lax review of confirmatory data.58 If the paternalist
invests significant political capital to advance paternalistic
policies, the pressure to find evidence confirming the need for
the paternalism is likely to be significant as well, making the
likelihood of a self-fulfilling prophecy quite high.
Second, labeling a contractual domain an area of consumer
exploitation is likely to lead to ex post facto requests for paternalistic intervention.59 Thus, in addition to paternalism’s interference with individual learning, the willingness of courts to
56. Kukla uses the term “autogenetic” as shorthand for beliefs that lead to
self-fulfilling or self-negating prophecies. See Andre Kukla, The Structure of
Self-Fulfilling and Self-Negating Prophecies, 4 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 5, 5
(1994).
57. Cf. Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 362 (1986) (“[I]ntervention to correct a market failure may have far more powerful secondary effects on
consumer satisfaction than has been commonly acknowledged . . . . [T]he social
engineer must be sensitive to the damage that is likely to be caused to the mechanics by which individuals regulate their choices.”).
58. See, e.g., Dale T. Miller & William Turnbull, Expectancies and Interpersonal Processes, 37 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 233, 244 (1986) (“The influence of
erroneous expectancies is not only manifest in the behavior of targets. In spite
of objective evidence to the contrary, perceivers may conclude that their expectancies have been confirmed. To the extent that confirmation is ‘in the eye of
the beholder,’ stereotypes and other false expectancies will persist even in the
face of objective disconfirmation.”). For a discussion of such confirmatory biases within behavioral law and economics, see Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1911, 2019 (2002).
59. See supra note 47. For additional cases in which plaintiffs have requested paternalistic protection from the courts for supposed manipulation of
cognitive or motivational biases, see Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 1166 n.12.

MITCHELL & KLICK_3FMT

1640

06/12/2006 08:35:32 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1620

engage in paternalistic oversight reduces the risk of personal
liability for poor choices and increases the likelihood that even
rational actors will seek relief from choices that turn out badly.
In other words, the motivational effects on litigants and lawyers of a paternalistic attitude in the courts add to paternalism’s autogenetic prospects.
Third, changing the market by restricting the profit exploitation opportunities of firms should cause rational firms to alter their exploitation strategies to preserve their profits.60 Paternalistic intervention thus breeds demand for more
paternalistic interventions, as the paternalist tries to keep pace
with the arbitrage efforts of firms seeking to exploit cognitive
biases.61 Such interference with competitive market forces may
adversely affect the development of rational behavior, because
highly competitive free markets tend to foster rational choice
better than less competitive and nontraditional markets.62 One
reason that rational choice theory fares best in highly competitive markets seems to be that these markets provide “external
scaffolding” for individual choice that channels behavior in utility-maximizing directions, while the environment in less competitive markets allows suboptimal behavior to survive and, in
some cases, even prosper.63 Thus, to the extent economic effi-

60. Cf. Frey & Eichenberger, supra note 42, at 219 (“Firms not only have
an incentive to exploit the given stock of anomalies but also an interest in expanding the existing capacity of anomalies (which allows them to raise exploitation). New anomalies can be detected by investing resources in appropriate
research, and known anomalies can be combined in such a way that they are
magnified.”); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 1424–25 (“[I]ndividuals’ irrationality makes them] susceptible to manipulation by those actors in a position
to influence the decisionmaking context. Moreover, the actors in the dominant
position must capitalize on this manipulation or eventually be displaced from
the market.”).
61. Alternatively, the paternalistic intervention may drive some firms
from the market, with possibly adverse effects on pricing in the market.
62. ANDY CLARK, BEING THERE: PUTTING BRAIN, BODY, AND WORLD TOGETHER AGAIN 183 (1997) (“[T]raditional economic theory nicely models choice
in competitive posted price markets and in certain restricted experimental
studies.”).
63. Clark explains how markets can foster rational choice:
[T]he crucial factor distinguishing the successful and unsuccessful
cases (of the use of neoclassical, substantive-rationality-assuming
theory) is the availability of a structurally determined theory of interests. In cases where the overall structuring environment acts so as to
select in favor of actions which are restricted so as to conform to a
specific model of preferences, neoclassical theory works. And it works
because individual psychology no longer matters: the “preferences”
are imposed by the wider situation and need not be echoed in individ-
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ciency is the primary goal, improving competition rather than
protecting individuals from their inefficient irrational tendencies is likely the better long-term strategy.
II. SIMPLE ECONOMIC MODELS OF BEHAVIOR
UNDER PATERNALISM
In order to make our somewhat vague claims about the
psychological and social effects of paternalism more concrete
and testable, we now promulgate economic models of decisionmaking behavior under paternalism. These models isolate the
variables likely to be important to cost-benefit calculations regarding alternative courses of action. Although there is some
evidence that individuals do engage in such cost-benefit calculations,64 it is not assumed that individuals consciously engage
in such cost-benefit calculations in all instances. Rather, empirical testing may reveal that in some situations individuals
engage in explicit cost-benefit reasoning along the lines we
suggest but that individuals also develop conditioned responses
to particular choice situations that reflect implicit or prior explicit cost-benefit analyses consistent with our hypotheses.65
ual psychology.
Id. Markets are thus just a special case of what Clark calls “external scaffolding” of thought: “Language and culture, in particular, emerge as advanced
species of external scaffolding ‘designed’ to squeeze maximum coherence and
utility from fundamentally short-sighted, special-purpose, internally fragmented minds.” Id. at 33. According to Clark, “we are masters at structuring
our physical and social worlds so as to press complex coherent behaviors
from . . . unruly resources. . . . Our brains make the world smart so that we
can be dumb in peace!” Id. at 180.
64. First, some individuals, particularly those with training in economics,
employ cost-benefit reasoning in their day-to-day lives. See, e.g., Richard P.
Larrick et al., Teaching the Use of Cost-Benefit Reasoning in Everyday Life, 1
PSYCHOL. SCI. 362 (1990); Richard P. Larrick et al., Who Uses Cost-Benefit
Rules of Choice? Implications for the Normative Status of Microeconomic Theory, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 331 (1993).
Second, all individuals seem to possess some ability to shift from intuitive
thought into a more deliberative mode of thought in which the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action are more carefully considered. See, e.g.,
ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 106 (1999).
65. An intriguing possibility is that the brain’s dopaminergic system operates on principles that approximate economic norms for evaluation, with
subconscious, neuron-level valuations of potential future rewards becoming
associated with different courses of action and activities causing changes in a
subset of dopamine neurons to improve the system’s ability to predict error
regarding future behaviors. See P. Read Montague & Gregory S. Berns, Neural
Economics and the Biological Substrates of Valuation, 36 NEURON 265, 281
(2002); see also Peter Dayan & Bernard W. Balleine, Reward, Motivation, and
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A. EX ANTE PATERNALISM
In a world of ex ante paternalism, choices are restricted
such that options disfavored by policy makers are removed
from an individual’s choice set or are taxed at a relatively high
level to discourage individuals from choosing them.66 While this
kind of paternalism has the potential to stop individuals from
making “mistakes” in their choices, it is not clear that this mistake avoidance is entirely salutary, as discussed above. Specifically, in a situation in which there are no artificial constraints
on the choice set, individuals have the incentive to invest effort
in searching for the choice that will maximize their utility.
Operationally, the individual faces the following maximization problem in which her choice of effort (e), which involves
some expenditure C, determines the probability (p) that she
will choose the good that provides her with high utility ( U H ) as
opposed to the good providing low utility ( U L ):

Max p e  U H  ª¬1  p e º¼ U L  C  e
e
which yields the solution

§ wp ·
¨ ¸ >U H  U L @ C
© we ¹
The first order condition implies that an individual’s choice
of search effort will be determined by: (1) the productivity of

§ wp ·
¸ or how much each unit of effort increases the
© we ¹

search ¨

Reinforcement Learning, 36 NEURON 285, 293 (2002); Paul W. Glimcher, Decisions, Decisions, Decisions: Choosing a Biological Science of Choice, 36 NEURON 323, 328–29 (2002). But see Colin Camerer et al., Neuroeconomics: How
Neuroscience Can Inform Economics, 43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 9, 55 (2005)
(“Our view is that establishing a neural basis for some rational choice principles will not necessarily vindicate the approach as widely applied to humans.”).
66. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, Smoking’s Internalities, 25 REGULATION
52 (2002/2003); Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”?
Theory and Evidence, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1261 (2001). Note that in these articles,
the taxation of cigarettes is advocated not because of the ability of taxation to
internalize the cost of external effects on third parties or even to account for
the costs that smoking imposes on the public health system (so-called fiscal
externalities), but rather such taxation is advocated to remedy “internalities”
(i.e., effects on a future self ). For a more direct exposition of this position, see
Jonathan Gruber & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers
Happier? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8872, 2002),
available at http://nber.org/papers/w8872.pdf.
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likelihood that the “right” good will be chosen;67 (2) the value of
choosing the correct as opposed to the incorrect good >U H  U L @
which is represented by the utility differential generated by the
two goods; and (3) the cost of effort.
As long as search effort is costly, an individual will likely
accept an expected outcome in which she sometimes chooses incorrectly because the marginal value of increased search, after
some point, will not exceed the marginal cost of the effort required by the search.68 However, in some ways, this one-time
static model of behavior undervalues the benefit provided by
search effort. That is, in many cases, effort in the current period provides benefits beyond the choice at hand. In the future,
if faced with the same choice, the individual’s cost of search effort will be reduced if she invested effort earlier.69 Effectively,
search effort is tantamount to a learning process and the stock
of information gathered during that process is accessible when
the decision must be made again in the future. This search effort may even pay dividends in situations in which an individual must make decisions in different, though related contexts.70
An individual’s cognitive capital can, in an abstract sense, be
divided into specific capital which is helpful in making the
same decision in the future, and general capital, which will be
helpful in making decisions that have elements in common
with decisions made in the past. Viewed in this way, any current search effort contributes to durable cognitive capital which
generates lower search costs in the future across a wide array
of decisions.71
67. Note that since we can normalize effort units in an arbitrary way, this
derivative term can also be interpreted as an elasticity.
68. This assumes an interior solution exists for the problem.
69. Alternately, one could frame this as improved productivity of search
for the same cost.
70. It is also possible that the search process will lead to domain-general
knowledge and strategies that pay dividends in even seemingly unrelated contexts. For instance, learning to think in an active, open-minded way, such that
one considers opposing positions and counterarguments to one’s initial position, has been shown effective at debiasing across several domains. See, e.g.,
Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913, 920 (1997); Asher Koriat et al., Reasons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 107, 116
(1980); Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy
for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1239 (1984);
Thomas Mussweiler et al., Overcoming the Inevitable Anchoring Effect: Considering the Opposite Compensates for Selective Accessibility, 26 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1142, 1149 (2000).
71. In terms of the self-regulation model of decision making, such a search
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In the choice-constrained world envisioned by some behavioral law and economics scholars, this search process is avoided
or diminished to the extent that the benefits of search effort are
significantly reduced. In the maximization problem laid out
above, it would be as if p were exogenously set by the paternalistic policy maker. If p is exogenous, and C is greater than zero,
the individual will not undertake any search effort.72 Her
choice will instead be made for her. This result is an application of the concept of moral hazard drawn from the economics
of insurance literature. Specifically, a moral hazard arises
when an individual receives no (or an attenuated) personal
benefit from her productive activity (generally, in this context,
the benefit comes in the form of a reduced cost); therefore, her
incentive to engage in the productive activity is diminished.
Her welfare, from this particular consumption decision, will
primarily be a function of the probability that the policy maker
has chosen correctly for her ( < ). Formally, restricting attention to the one-time decision case, the individual will be better
off in the choice-constrained world if

<  U H  1  < U L ! p e* U H  ª¬1  p e* º¼ U L  C  e*
*
where e is the individual’s optimal level of search effort in the
nonpaternalistic setting.
Simplified, this condition requires that the expected benefit
of the paternalistic system, < U H  U L , must be greater than
the expected outcome of the search model net of search costs,
p e*  U H  U L  C  e* , if paternalism is to benefit an individual. Such a condition will hold if the policy maker is almost as
likely to choose correctly as the individual is, where the allowable gap in likelihoods is determined by the cost of search effort
relative to the utility gap between the correct and incorrect outcan lead to gains in crystallized intelligence (acquisition of facts) or fluid intelligence (acquisition of problem-solving strategies) of a domain-specific or domain-general nature. See Margaret E. Beier & Phillip L. Ackerman, Age, Ability, and the Role of Prior Knowledge on the Acquisition of New Domain
Knowledge: Promising Results in a Real-World Learning Environment, 20
PSYCHOL. & AGING 341, 341 (2005) (“Fluid intelligence (Gf . . . , as the processing and reasoning components of intelligence) has been identified as an aptitude for learning, whereas crystallized intelligence (Gc) is generally defined as
the knowledge acquired through education and experience.”).
72. In the case where the choice set is reduced to some lower number of
options but still allows some choice, incentives to invest effort in search will be
reduced, as will be the case where the policy maker uses tax policy to induce a
certain choice rather than by constraining the choice set directly.
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*

comes,

C e
. That is, if the policy maker has a lower likeliUH UL

hood of choosing correctly for the individual, we might still favor paternalism if the cost of search effort is very high or if the
gap between the correct and incorrect outcomes is very small
(e.g., perhaps the policy maker has realized economies of scale
in information acquisition that the individual cannot, or the
choice alternatives differ little, as in certain insurance markets).73
Note that in the above analysis we ignore the cost to the
policy maker of determining which choice to impose. This omission seems reasonable if the population is generally homogenous in preferences, or if, for the choice at hand, there is a
great deal of agreement regarding what constitutes the correct
choice. In these cases, the policy maker enjoys economies of
scale in its own decision costs since, effectively, one choice is
made for the entire population, whereas in the nonpaternalistic
world, each individual would undertake her own search costs to
arrive at what would end up being a common choice.
However, the reasonable scope of paternalism shrinks considerably when there is more heterogeneity of preferences
among the population. As heterogeneity grows, if the policy
maker does not have the ability to offer different choice sets to
different people based upon their underlying preferences, <
will decrease relative to p e* . Also, as heterogeneity grows, if
the policy maker attempts to offer different constrained choice
sets to individuals based on their preferences, the economies of
scale in search costs for the policy maker break down.
In homogenous populations, however, even if the formal
case for paternalism strengthens, the practical case is weakened. Individuals with similar preferences will be able to
economize on information by simply aping those around them
in their choices. Further, in such situations, market pressures
will induce firms to provide goods and services that satisfy
73. For instance, Baker and colleagues find that more actively managed
funds, in terms of turnover, exhibit significantly better performance than
funds with low turnover. However, funds in the highest turnover quintile only
outperform those in the lowest quintile by thirty-four basis points on an annualized basis. Thus, if paternalistic regulations prohibited individuals from investing in high-turnover funds, some people would be made worse off, but the
effect would be relatively small. See Malcolm Baker et al., Can Mutual Fund
Managers Pick Stocks? Evidence from Their Trades Prior to Earnings Announcements 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10685,
2004), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10685.pdf.
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those common preferences, weeding out the goods and services
that individuals do not want.
The strongest case for paternalism centers around the case
where an individual’s optimal likelihood of choosing correctly is
low relative to the policy maker’s ability to choose correctly for
the individual because the relationship between her effort and
likelihood of choosing correctly is low (or, isomorphicly, because
her cost of effort is very high). That is, we would view paternalism most favorably when it is relatively costly for an individual
to improve her decision making (e.g., in high-stakes decisions
where choices are irrevocable and there is little prior chance for
learning). Again, as indicated in the simple model above, in a
one-shot transaction, the efficiency of this paternalism depends
on the policy maker choosing correctly. However, this welfare
analysis ignores the capital stock aspect of individuals investing in cognitive effort. That is, if individuals are effectively precluded from engaging in search at time t because of the policy
maker’s decision to constrain the choice set, the individual will
have a relatively smaller stock of cognitive capital to draw upon
in a similar choice at time t+1.
In terms of specific capital, this diminution of the capital
stock might not be very costly if the paternalist continues to
constrain choice in this area for the foreseeable future. However, unless the paternalist constrains choice in very many contexts, the decrease in general cognitive capital has the potential
to harm the individual. That is, while in the unconstrained
world an individual’s cost of cognitive effort will decrease over
time because she has contributed to her capital stock through
prior decision-making processes and learning, her decisionmaking capacities will not be exercised in the paternalistic domain. This unintended cost of paternalistic policies reflects a
sort of “cognitive hazard.”
Assuming that policy makers cannot constrain choices in
every context (e.g., due to excessive policy-making and enforcement costs) or do not wish to do so because of the existence
of sufficiently diverse populations or concerns about personal
rights in some contexts, then an optimally designed paternalistic system needs to consider the cost of this cognitive hazard.
Practically speaking, a social planner would need to examine
the benefits of constraining choice by comparing the expected
gain from choice constraint relative to the individual’s choice in
the unconstrained world in which she optimally chooses her
cognitive effort level, recognizing possible reductions in cogni-
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tive capital that will be occasioned by constraining the choice
set. Presumably, adding this element to the calculation would
not reduce the set of welfare-enhancing paternalistic interventions to the null set, but it would raise the bar for a policy of ex
ante paternalism.
B. EX POST PATERNALISM
If behavioral biases are not completely exogenous, then
they will be sensitive to changes in the net costs generated by
the bias as well.74 To the extent that paternalistic interventions
shield an individual from the costs generated by her deviations
from rationality,75 on the margin, she will have greater incentive to exhibit the bias, or, perhaps more intuitively, she will
have less of an incentive to surmount her biases. The insurance
generated by ex post paternalist protections has the potential
to generate the kind of moral hazard that is commonly associated with insurance.76
If cognitive biases are responsive to incentives, the efficiency arguments advanced by supporters of ex post paternalism are drawn into question. That is, if an individual recognizes that she will be protected from the consequences of her
74. For a discussion of evidence in support of the view that individuals are
sensitive to the costs of psychological bias, and that they often engage in selfcorrective actions in attempts to counter the effects of bias, sometimes with
success and sometimes without success, see Kahneman, supra note 20, at 710–
12; see also Diego Fernandez-Duque et al., Executive Attention and Metacognitive Regulation, 9 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 288, 293 (2000) (noting that
“[n]ormal subjects have the ability to internally evaluate their own performance, detecting errors even in the absence of any external feedback,” although
the authors do not specifically discuss nationality errors); Frey & Eichenberger, supra note 42, at 223 (“Individuals falling prey to an anomaly are often
aware that they act in a non-rational way and that they could improve their
utility or profit by adjusting their behavior. Perception is the more likely, the
less costly is a comparison with non-anomalous behavior.”).
75. See, e.g., Korobkin, Standard Form Contracts, supra note 3, at 1207
(“By recognizing purchasers’ bounded rationality as the most important root
cause of inefficiency in form contracts, courts can modify their use of unconscionability analysis to increase both social welfare generally and buyer welfare specifically.”).
76. Arguably, moral hazard as it is invoked in the economics literature is
simply an application of the law of demand, which states that as the price of
an activity decreases, an individual will increase her consumption of the activity. See Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Subsidizing Addiction: Do
State Health Insurance Mandates Increase Alcohol Consumption, 35 J. LEG.
STUD. 175, 177 (2006); Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, The Effect of
Abortion Legalization on Sexual Behavior: Evidence from Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 32 J. LEG. STUD. 407, 412 (2003).
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decisions either because of statutory proclamation or because of
her knowledge that courts have acted paternalistically toward
others in similar situations, she will not invest an optimal level
of cognitive effort. Thus, the short-term efficiency gain posited
by the paternalists may not offset the efficiency loss that will
apply to parties in the future.
As a simple illustration of this relationship, take an individual who can achieve either of two utility levels in a given
transaction: the outcome that would occur if there were no cognitive limitation present U H and the outcome resulting in the
presence of the cognitive limitation U L . By assumption, U H
is strictly greater than U L . The individual can exert greater
cognitive effort e to increase her probability p of attaining
U H , but each additional unit of effort reduces her utility by C.
Further, she has some expectation that in the event she realizes U L as the end state of the transaction, the courts will compensate her with some award that increases her utility by I.
In deciding on the level of cognitive effort she wishes to expend, the individual faces the following maximization problem:

Max p e U H  ª¬1  p e º¼ U L  ª¬1  p e º¼ I  C  e
e
Effectively, the individual is maximizing her expected utility from the transaction, including the insurance provided to
her by the paternalistic institution, net of the disutility she experiences by exerting increased cognitive effort.77
The result of this maximization problem can be characterized by the function’s first order condition:

wp
UH UL  I
we

C

The condition presented above has the intuitive implication
that an individual will continue to expend effort up to the point
where doing so is cost justified. That is, given that each additional unit of effort decreases her utility by C, she will only expend additional effort if her expected gain in utility of doing so
is greater than C.
It is immediately apparent that if the difference between

77. This cognitive effort cost could take many forms. The most direct
would simply be the time cost of considering the transaction at greater length
in order to determine whether the individual is receiving the greatest gain
possible from the bargain.
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U H and U L is entirely offset by the “insurance” payment provided by the paternalistic institution, the individual will expend no cognitive effort.78 This stands in contrast to the result
that exists in a world with no paternalism. If there is no insurance in the model, the individual will exert some positive level
of cognitive effort as long as U H ! U L .
The situation becomes more acute if a given cognitive limitation worsens through reinforcement. That is, if an individual
is protected from the costs of her limitation in period 1, the
magnitude of the limitation is larger in period 2 because of conditioning or adaptation. Another way to understand the effect
is that the cost of cognitive effort in period t decreases as cognitive capital is built up through exercising cognitive faculties in
periods prior to t. Effectively then, paternalist protection not
only generates a moral hazard in which an individual underinvests in cognitive effort during the current period, but it also
reduces an individual’s cognitive abilities in future periods
relative to the situation in which no protection is provided. In
the no-protection case, an individual will have an incentive to
consider the effect of current expenditures on cognitive effort on
the cost of future cognitive effort. The presence of insurance
against the costs of cognitive mistakes currently and the expectation of insurance in the future both reduce cognitive investments. This phenomenon is the manifestation of our cognitive
hazard concept in the context of ex post paternalistic interventions.79
78. In fact, in such a situation, the individual will be at a corner solution
in which she would like to expend negative amounts of effort if she were compensated for doing so (i.e., if she could face a negative cost of effort).
79. Although the concept of cognitive hazard, in principle, can be seen as
an extension of the moral hazard idea, it is analytically useful to keep the two
phenomena distinct in any welfare analysis given the different time frames
that are relevant for each. That is, because the costs of cognitive hazards are
only realized in the future, they should be discounted appropriately by a social
planner, while the costs associated with moral hazards will be realized at the
time the current decision takes place. For example, assume an individual can
invest $1 worth of effort to guarantee that she will achieve the high utility
outcome (which exceeds the low utility outcome by $5) now and whenever she
is in a similar situation in the future, but she has no incentive to make that
investment due to the existence of insurance provided by the paternalist which
involves a transfer of $5 to the individual and administrative costs of $1. The
social cost of the moral hazard in this situation is zero because the individual’s
cost of effort equals the social cost of administering the paternalistic insurance. However, the social cost of her cognitive hazard (i.e., the failure to improve cognitive capital to draw on in future situations) will be the present
value of $1 for every instance in the future in which this transaction arises
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C. A ROLE FOR EDUCATION
The cost of cognitive effort, and hence the magnitude of a
revealed limitation, will not only be dependent upon an individual’s own internal investments, but may be influenced by
external investments in the form of education. That is, in some
circumstances, individuals can learn debiasing techniques that
increase the likelihood of rational choice.80
One of the simplest ways to add education to our primary
model is to assume that the probability of choosing the correct
option is a function of education inputs (E) and cognitive effort
inputs (e).81 Thus, if an individual were free to improve her deagain using the relevant social discount rate. Had the individual invested in
effort during the first transaction, by assumption, there would be no need for
the paternalist to remedy her mistake through the insurance mechanism in
the future. If, instead, the insurance program entails administrative costs that
exceed the individual’s cost of effort, say by $2, the moral hazard cost of the
original intervention would be $1 which represents the differential resources
consumed by the paternalistic remedy relative to what the individual would
have needed to expend to reach the high utility. This is a current cost of the
system and so it is not discounted, while the cognitive hazard costs will be discounted as before. Thus, as long as the social planner assumes a positive discount rate, moral hazard costs (i.e., costs that are currently realized) will be
weighted relatively more heavily than cognitive hazard costs (i.e., costs that
will be realized in the future).
80. Given the relative neglect of statistical and economic training at the
compulsory education levels, it should not be particularly surprising that people often evince poor comprehension of statistical and economics concepts. See
PETER SEDLMEIER, IMPROVING STATISTICAL REASONING: THEORETICAL MODELS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 196 (1999) (discussing the low levels of statistical education at primary and secondary school levels); William B. Walstad,
Economic Education in U.S. High Schools, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 195, 208 (2001)
(“Less than half of all high school graduates take a well-defined high school
economics course at present.”). Nevertheless, a number of educational programs have been shown effective at debiasing. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law
and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law
and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 87–94 (2002) (summarizing evidence on the relationship between education and rationality); id. at
132–35 (summarizing evidence on procedural debiasing techniques). See generally Richard P. Larrick, Debiasing, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK ON JUDGMENT
AND DECISION MAKING 316 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (describing debiasing strategies for individuals). For a recent study suggesting
that education can have positive effects on the expression of psychological biases, see Daniel J. Benjamin & Jesse Shapiro, Does Cognitive Ability Reduce
Psychological Bias? 25–26 (Feb. 25, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=675264 (reporting that although the primary
finding of the study was “a robust positive relationship between cognitive ability and normative decision-making,” there is some evidence that “seems to
suggest that human capital policy may indeed be able to improve economic decision-making.” (footnote omitted)).
81. Operationally, this could be modeled in a number of ways. We choose

MITCHELL & KLICK_3FMT

06/12/2006 08:35:32 AM

REGULATION OF IRRATIONALITY

2006]

1651

cision-making process by investing in education at the cost of G
per educational unit and cognitive effort at the cost of C per effort unit, she would face the following maximization problem:

Max p e, E  U H  ª¬1  p e, E º¼ U L  C  e  G  E
e, E
generating the following first order conditions:

§ wp ·
¨ ¸ >U H  U L @ C
© we ¹
§ wp ·
¨
¸ >U H  U L @ G
© wE ¹
which can be combined into the following relationship:

wp
wp

we
wE

C
G

This result holds that the individual will set her marginal
rate of substitution82 between cognitive effort and education
equal to the cost ratio of the two inputs. Thus, as long as there
is some gain from improving p,83 as cognitive effort grows more
expensive relative to education, the individual will invest in
more education and vice versa.
However, if the individual is making her decision within a
paternalistic institution such that her choice set is censored or
such that she will be saved from making a bad decision, she
will invest less in both education and cognitive effort, generating the same short-term moral hazards discussed above. This
will also generate the longer-term cognitive hazard discussed
above, as the individual has less incentive to invest in her cognitive capital through effort or education.

to present a model in which education and effort are substitute inputs in the
probability function, but the intuition would not change if the two inputs were
modeled as complements such that p was a function of effort times education
or such that education reduced the per unit cost of cognitive effort.
82. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 54 (1995).
83. This will be the case as long as the gap between UH and UL (net of the
implicit insurance payment available if this is a case of ex ante paternalism) is
smaller than the minimum of C and G. That is, as long as there is an interior
solution to the optimization problem.
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The addition of education to the model, however, suggests
an alternate route through which paternalist policy makers can
affect an individual’s chances of choosing the correct option
from a set, namely, the paternalist may subsidize the individual’s educational inputs. This option, however, is not a perfect
one. While under most circumstances such a subsidy will increase aggregate cognitive inputs (i.e., effort plus education),
there will also be some substitution effect whereby, on the
margin, the individual will decrease her own cognitive effort
and education inputs. That is, it will generally not be the case
that the paternalist can increase aggregate inputs one for one.
If the paternalist provides a subsidy paying for one unit of education, the individual’s aggregate input units will increase by
less than one unit.
The provision of paternalistic education subsidies could be
justified, however, under several conditions. Most obviously, if
the paternalist can provide education at a lower per unit cost,
even taking the individual’s substitution into account, paternalist education provision would be efficient. This should be the
case when there are economies of scale involved in cognitive
education. Educational subsidies could also be justified in cases
where individuals are assumed to save (i.e., invest in cognitive
capital) too little due to peculiar discounting functions,84 so long
as this limited savings tendency generates some kind of relevant externality.85
This alternative paternalistic policy tool, and the recognition that individuals will react in complex ways to paternalistic
policy interventions, implies that optimal paternalism will
typically involve more than simply identifying a bias and counteracting it directly through legal and policy institutions. Instead, optimal paternalism represents a mechanism design
problem in which a social planner must consider using more
than just the sledgehammer of constraining choice sets ex ante
or providing implicit social insurance through some form of ex
84. For example, if an individual exhibits hyperbolic discounting as hypothesized by Laibson and others. See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and
Hyperbolic Discounting, 62 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997).
85. As in Gruber’s “internality” argument, in which the present self does
not take the well-being of the future self into account, or when there are socalled fiscal externalities, where an individual’s poor decisions affect others
through governmental programs. See Edgar K. Browning, The Myth of Fiscal
Externalities, 27 PUB. FIN. REV. 3 (1999). For example, given the U.S. welfare
system, it may be the case that we want to induce individuals to save more so
that they do not end up drawing resources from public assistance programs.
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post paternalism. In addition to those tools, the paternalist
should consider the indirect tool of education. Further, as implied above, the paternalist should recognize that short-term
gains from interventions may be mitigated by long-term losses
in cognitive capital, at least in some contexts for some individuals.
III. OPTIMAL DESIGN OF PATERNALISTIC
INTERVENTIONS
In this Part, we consider the factors likely to affect optimal
institutional design undertaken to counter supposed inefficiencies associated with irrational behavior. A social planner
charged with designing an optimal system would presumably
have as control variables the degree to which choices are constrained or the level of insurance provided to biased individuals
and the level of debiasing education available. As noted above,
choice sets may be constrained directly or indirectly through
taxes, and social insurance may take the form of judicial decisions (including bankruptcy decrees) to transfer wealth from an
individual who benefits from another individual’s bias to the
biased individual herself. Imposing no choice-set constraint or
offering no insurance would represent a laissez-faire stance in
which there is no paternalistic oversight of the biased behavior.
The education variable would involve providing resources for
decision-making education or debiasing in the existing school
system or through subsidies to market providers of debiasing
education.86
Our psychological and economic accounts of behavior under
paternalism suggest that the optimal mix of paternalistic and
educational interventions will depend upon the following factors: (1) the efficiency loss due to current underinvestment in
cognitive effort and education; (2) the capitalized loss of the future return due to current underinvestment in cognitive effort
86. In addition to making educational investments to improve one’s own
decision-making competence, a common strategy to overcome personal limitations is to rely on the expertise of others. See BYRNES, supra note 22, at 52 (“In
summary, the data suggests that certain forms of advice seeking increase with
age, others decrease, and others stay the same. From the standpoint of [the
self-regulation model], self-regulated decision-makers seek advice only when it
is necessary and seek it in appropriate ways.”). A social planner could be designated to choose the appropriate level of education and the most efficient mix
of educational providers. If it seems unlikely that individuals will seek out
education on their own, it might be useful to provide it through existing compulsory schooling.
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and education; (3) the costs of private effort and education and
the costs of public education subsidies; (4) the efficiency gains
from limiting decision-making mistakes; (5) the efficiency costs
of the policy maker choosing incorrectly for some individuals;87
(6) the welfare gains of discouraging the exploitation of cognitive biases; and (7) the nondistortionary costs of developing and
enforcing the constrained choice set and paternalistic insurance
system (i.e., administrative costs).
Unfortunately, very little empirical information exists to
help us place parameters on these factors with respect to the
consequences of particular anomalies (i.e., with respect to factors four and six in particular),88 because most paternalistic
proposals within behavioral law and economics proceed from
little more than an identification of a cognitive bias that may
explain a pattern of seemingly inefficient choices.89 In many instances it is extremely difficult to tie apparent real-world inefficiencies to a market failure based on irrational behavior as
opposed to some other defect in the marketplace,90 and in some
87. This cost is most obvious in the constrained choice set case. However,
costs of this nature also accrue to ex post paternalistic interventions to the extent that they inject uncertainty in transactions (e.g., reliance on contract
terms).
88. Cf. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related
Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 255 (2001) (asserting that proponents arguing for
enterprise liability within products liability law on grounds that markets exploit psychological biases to manipulate consumer perceptions of product risks
“fail[ ] to provide a serious quantitative assessment of the extent of market
manipulation”).
89. This practice follows from the practice within psychology to focus on
demonstrating deviations from rationality rather than examining the costs,
adaptivity, or boundaries of such deviations. See Krueger & Funder, supra
note 20, at 313 (noting that mainstream social psychology’s “prevalent research strategy has been to propose a prescriptive norm for social behavior or
cognition and then to demonstrate that human performance falls short of it.”);
Ralph Hertwig & Annika Wallin, Out of the Theoretical Cul-de-Sac, 27 BEHAV.
& BRAIN SCI. 342, 343 (2004) (“Social psychology and related fields have oversold violations of behavioral and cognitive norms.”). There appears, however,
to be some movement toward a more balanced view of human cognition within
psychology, if not behavioral economics. See Andreas Ortmann & Michal
Ostatnicky, Proper Experimental Design and Implementation Are Necessary
Conditions For a Balanced Social Psychology, 27 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 352,
352 (2004) (“[A]lthough the unbalanced view of humans as cognitive misers
seems slowly but surely on its way out in social psychology and judgment and
decision-making, the heuristics-and-biases program, which seems mostly responsible for the unbalanced view, has during the past decade invaded economics with little resistance . . . .” (citations omitted)).
90. For an illustration of the difficulty in quantifying welfare costs attrib-
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cases even designating the optimal behavior is difficult.91 Given
utable to irrational behavior, see Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded
Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482
(2002). Tor does an admirable job considering possible explanations for excessive business-startup behavior from both rational choice and boundedrationality perspectives and considering the positive and negative effects of
excessive-startup behavior. Ultimately, however, he notes the difficulty of
reaching firm conclusions about the efficiency effects of irrational behavior in
this context:
In principle, an effective detection and prevention of some negative net present value entry at the margin could be beneficial. The
problem is, however, that there is no easy means of quantifying with
any certainty the benefits and costs of entry. Measuring the direct
deadweight losses of negative expected value entry is the least difficult, since—at least in principle—one could calculate the number of
failed entrants per industry and the average costs they have sunk
into their ventures. The calculation of net losses would be more complex, though, for those entrants who obtain some profits before exiting
the market.
It is even less clear, moreover, how to measure the externalities of
entry . . . .
An examination of the quantities that must be measured for any
quantification of the positive externalities of negative expected value
entry reveals another impenetrable maze.
Id. at 546. Tor concludes that greater governmental regulation of market entry cannot be justified. See id. at 567 (“A comparison of the social costs and
benefits of negative expected value entry found, however, that while overconfident entrants generate negative externalities, they also bring about significant social benefits . . . . Upon further analysis it also became apparent that
the regulation of entry would not only be mostly undesirable, but also costly,
impractical, and largely ineffective.”). We suspect that if other behavioral law
and economics scholars undertook similar attempts to quantify the social costs
and benefits of seemingly irrational behavior they would reach similar conclusions, or at least be less sanguine about the benefits of intervention.
91. Identifying optimal behavior is particularly difficult with respect to
intertemporal choices, for it is not clear how one should optimize between present and future aims. See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time
Preference: A Critical Review, in TIME AND DECISION 13, 19 (George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003) (noting that, although the discounted utility (DU) model
has become the normative model of intertemporal choice within economics,
“Samuelson did not endorse the DU model as a normative model of intertemporal choice”); id. at 30 (“[T]he patterns of preferences that are regarded as
‘anomalies’ in the context of the DU model do not necessarily violate any standard or principle that people believe they should uphold. Even when the choice
pattern is pointed out to people, they do not regard themselves as having
made a mistake (and probably have not made one!).”); see also Jay Bhattacharya & Darius Lakdawalla, Time-Inconsistency and Welfare 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10345, 2004), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10345.
Also, it can be very difficult to predict exactly how a bias will evidence itself in complex situations. Yet the efficiency potential of various interventions
may depend quite heavily on knowing the functional form of the underlying
bias to be remedied. As demonstrated in Eric Posner’s discussion of optimism
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the difficulties of quantifying aggregate social costs of irrational
behavior, a fallback position would be to estimate the strength
or prevalence of the biased behavior itself. Yet in most cases
the proposals do not even contain information about the base
rate frequency of the biased behavior within the target population, much less an estimate of the economic losses to individuals of the biased behavior.92
Despite the dearth of empirical data relevant to many of
these factors, we may nevertheless offer some guidance on the
issues raised by these factors. First, many anomalies exhibit
considerable elasticity in response to education, material incentives, and self-initiated effortful thought.93 The greater the
elasticity, the less compelling the argument for hard paternalism absent data on the welfare costs of an anomaly. The common use of experimental studies that focus on demonstrating
anomalies rather than testing the limits of the anomalies often
masks both individual and situational differences in biased behavior.94
bias, for instance, plausible assumptions about the risk-limiting behavior of an
irrational optimist may completely reverse the optimal policy recommendation. See Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Some Normative Implications for Tort and Contract Law, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 125, 127–
28 (2004).
92. This failure to consider base rates of cognitive bias is a function of the
conflation of statistically significant experimental findings with findings of
practical significance outside the laboratory. That is, if a study finds that a
statistically significant percentage of the participants exhibited irrational behavior, then the finding is couched as evidence of some irrational tendency.
Yet in many cases only a minority of participants needs to exhibit the biased
behavior to achieve statistical significance (i.e., for the researcher to conclude
that the bias is not simply random error). For a more detailed discussion of the
importance of distinguishing between statistical and practical significance, see
Mitchell, supra note 58, at 1954–60. Failure to consider base rates may contribute to what Sunstein calls “probability neglect” driving policy: “the demand
for legal intervention can be greatly affected by probability neglect, so that
government may end up engaging in extensive regulation precisely because
intense emotional reactions are making people relatively insensitive to the
(low) probability that the relevant dangers will ever come to fruition.” Cass R.
Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J.
61, 68 (2002).
93. For a detailed discussion of the considerable individual differences
and situational variation in rational and irrational behavior, see Mitchell, supra note 80, at 83–119, 139–67.
94. See, e.g., Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham,
The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 147, 149 (1991) (“Many studies in the judgment literature merely indicate whether a bias exists according to a particular statistical
level of probability. This knowledge, however, is not adequate information for

MITCHELL & KLICK_3FMT

2006]

06/12/2006 08:35:32 AM

REGULATION OF IRRATIONALITY

1657

Second, some very simple—and presumably cheap-toimplement—educational and procedural interventions prove
quite effective at debiasing. For instance, short courses in statistical reasoning that could easily be incorporated into an educational curriculum show great promise.95
Third, we should expect greater error in the paternalist’s
specification of a restricted choice set (the fifth factor) in markets with traditionally large numbers of options or many heterogeneous goods. This is particularly true for highly competitive markets, where such heterogeneity of goods can be seen as
reflective of true heterogeneous demand. The need for governmental intervention should be less in such markets assuming
that it is difficult for firms to distinguish between rational and
irrational consumers, because bias-exploiting contractual terms
should be less likely to persist in such markets.96 Thus, a persistent supply of heterogeneous goods in a market populated by
many firms may serve as a rough indicator that rational consumer behavior predominates in this market.

a practitioner deciding whether to be concerned about a bias.”); Chris Swoyer,
Judgment and Decision-Making: Extrapolations and Applications, in JUDGMENTS, DECISIONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 9, 11 (Rajeev Gowda & Jeffrey C. Fox
eds., 2002) (“Although little work has been done on individual differences in
judgment and choice, these differences are often substantial, and researchers
are beginning to ask: Who reasons in which ways?”).
95. See SEDLMEIER, supra note 80, at 140–41 (summarizing the results of
a series of studies on training in statistical reasoning which found large immediate training effects, high transfer to tasks not used in the training, and
generally high long-term gains from the training); Peter Sedlmeier & Gerd
Gigerenzer, Teaching Bayesian Reasoning in Less Than Two Hours, 130 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 380, 396–97 (2001) (presenting results from
training studies indicating that Bayesian reasoning may be improved dramatically through various types of short training programs). Sedlmeier and
Gigerenzer focused primarily on the training of college students. For an example of successful training in probabilistic thinking among third-graders, see
Graham A. Jones et al., Students’ Probabilistic Thinking in Instruction, 30 J.
RES. IN MATHEMATICS EDUC. 487 (1999). For an example of successful training of novice probation officers in the use of statistical principles to predict behavior, see Geoffrey T. Fong et al., Improving Probation Decisions Through
Statistical Training, 17 CRIM. J. & BEHAV. 370 (1990).
96. See Alan Schwartz, How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?
29–30 (Am. L. & Econ. Ass’n Ann. Meetings, Working Paper No. 29, 2004),
available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1158&context=
alea (“If some consumers are sophisticated while others are naive, but firms
cannot tell into which class a consumer falls, and if all consumer types will
shop for low prices and preferred contracts, then competition among firms for
the marginal consumer will lower the price of every contract type. Further, if
there are enough sophisticated consumers, and if the other consumers are not
very naive . . . only good contracts will exist in equilibrium.”).
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Fourth, allowing individuals to exploit the cognitive biases
of their trading partners creates incentives for rent seeking on
the part of the unbiased individual. That is, investments to exploit cognitive biases may increase the profits of the exploiter
but decrease total welfare.97 To the extent that courts undo
such transactions, the insurance simply takes the form of a
wealth transfer from the exploiter to the exploited. However,
this wealth transfer improves efficiency because it discourages
exploiter investments ex ante. But note that if the elasticities
referenced in the first two factors are nonzero, investments in
exploitation will actually have a debiasing effect on biased individuals. Thus, it is necessary to net out these benefits when
considering the costs of this rent-seeking behavior. In effect,
education and exploitation are substitute avenues for tempering cognitive biases. Each carries a cost in that education will
consume resources and exploitation will generate transaction
elements that lower total welfare. In areas where cognitive bias
elasticities are high, the optimal solution will be to limit paternalistic interventions and to provide some educational subsidy.
When elasticities are low, optimality will likely demand protection of the biased. The chosen mix of partial protection and
education will depend on the relative elasticities and the relative costs of cognitive effort, education, and the paternalistic intervention.98
Finally, the administrative costs of paternalism (the sev-

97. This claim is similar but stronger than that made by Korobkin in his
form contracts paper. There Korobkin states that firms will compete on salient
attributes of form contracts and ignore nonsalient attributes, yielding a transaction that lowers total welfare. See Korobkin, Standard Form Contracts, supra note 3, at 1234 (“Although market forces should ensure that sellers will
offer efficient salient contract terms, non-salient attributes are subject to inefficiencies driven by the strategic behavior of sellers attempting to increase
their profits at the expense of unknowing buyers.”). If we add to this calculation investments in exploitation tools, the welfare loss grows even larger.
98. Other, nonefficiency concerns may exist as well. For example, judicially provided insurance will involve wealth transfers from the exploiter to
the exploited, which implies that the exploited held a property right not to be
exploited. Such an assignment of property rights is not normatively required.
In fact, one could argue that switching to a legal regime that accommodates
biases through these kinds of wealth transfers violates the property rights of
the exploiters. Cf. Frey & Eichenberger, supra note 42, at 228 (“In today’s welfare-oriented societies, both the existing law as well as government in pursuit
of votes tend to work against the economic elimination of actors falling prey to
anomalies. Actors, whether individuals or firms, who behave ‘irrationally’ are
prevented from bankruptcy or even major losses, while ‘rational’ actors evading anomalies are ‘punished’ by being taxed.”).
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enth factor) should take into account the transaction costs of
judicial policing of transactions as well as the dampening effect
on trade that will occur as individuals effectively lose some
freedom to contract. That is, to the extent that courts police
transactions, uncertainty about the enforceability of a contract
increases, which should lead to less contracting or higher prices
to offset enforcement cost increases.
In this discussion of optimal institutional design, we exhibit a bias for quantification of the social costs and benefits of
paternalistic versus laissez-faire responses to irrational behavior, despite the realization that quantifying these costs and
benefits will often be very difficult. We feel that such a bias is
nevertheless appropriate because of the risks of “anecdotal policy making.” Just as some complain about the use of “just so”
rational choice stories to explain away anomalous behavior,99 a
corresponding complaint can be made about the use of anomaly
stories to drive public policy. As demonstrated by the proliferation of bounded rationality accounts of legally significant behavior, it is quite easy to generate stories that explain legal
phenomena in terms of one of the many behavioral anomalies
that have been identified within psychology and behavioral
economics.100 Yet these expert opinions are much more prone to
diagnostic and prediction errors than a reliance on actuarial or
statistical data,101 and hence seeking to quantify the costs and
benefits of irrationality regulation may serve a useful disciplining effect that leads to more rational policy making.102
99. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian Methodology, 22
CARDOZO L. REV. 351, 352 (2001) (“I explore at length the degeneration of
Posner’s conception of rationality from the elegant, if simplistic, model drawn
from neoclassical economics to its current ad hoc state.”).
100. See John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 669,
670 (1996) (“The sheer number of experiments reporting biases is so great that
a sizable number of books and long survey papers have been written just to
review the evidence.”); Krueger & Funder, supra note 20, at 317 (“Just as God
has been said to have an inordinate fondness for beetles, having made so
many, social psychologists may have an inordinate fondness for errors, having
found so many.” (citation omitted)). In many cases, however, one bias story can
be countered with another bias story given the proliferation of experimentally
found biases. See Ortmann & Ostatnicky, supra note 89, at 352 n.1 (noting
that in many cases psychologists have identified a bias and a “contradictory
sibling” bias).
101. See generally MICHAEL A. BISHOP & J.D. TROUT, EPISTEMOLOGY AND
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN JUDGMENT (2004) (discussing the benefits of statistical prediction rules).
102. Cf. William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51
DUKE L.J. 629, 631 (2001) (“In many settings, the fallible opinions of isolated
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Indeed, one of the key messages of behavioral law and economics—that intuitive judgments will often lead one astray—
brings into question the use of plausibility as a guide to action.
That is, contrary to the position recently advocated by Russell
Korobkin,103 telling a plausible story about irrational behavior
to support a paternalistic intervention, without more, counts as
little justification for the intervention given the malleability of
plausibility impressions.104 Put in the language of scientific
testing, telling a story that seems plausible in light of the data
provides a fairly weak test of a policy proposal, while the quantification of costs and benefits serves as a much more severe

experts should be supplemented or replaced by statistical data. Those opinions
should be seen as a kind of crude second-best, far inferior to the data that it
approximates.”).
103. See Russell Korobkin, Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 783 (2005) (“I propose that the choice between using [a Rational Choice Theory]-based behavioral assumption and a
[Behavioral Decision Theory]-based behavioral assumption in law and economics analysis should turn on the relative plausibility of competing accounts in
light of existing knowledge, which is often incomplete and indeterminate.”). To
the extent Korobkin can be understood to argue that behavioral decision theory accounts should initially be treated as more plausible than rational choice
accounts if the former derive from empirical studies and the latter from intuitive, a priori assumptions, we are more sympathetic to Korobkin’s argument.
And we certainly agree with the spirit of Korobkin’s argument that models
with arguably implausible assumptions should be subjected to empirical testing. See id.
104. The relative plausibility standard raises serious problems with respect
to what Dawes calls “pseudodiagnosticity” if all we have to guide us is a qualitative assessment of which hypothesis seems better supported by the evidence,
evidence which may be selectively gathered by each competing camp:
The main problem here is that hypotheses are not compared: instead,
single hypotheses are evaluated in terms of the degree to which evidence is “consistent with” them; in addition, evidence is often sought
in terms of its consistency with or inconsistency with “favorite hypotheses”—rather than in terms of its ability to distinguish between
hypotheses.
Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making and Judgment, in 1 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 497, 533 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1998); see also ROBYN M. DAWES, EVERYDAY IRRATIONALITY: HOW PSEUDOSCIENTISTS, LUNATICS, AND THE REST OF US SYSTEMATICALLY FAIL TO THINK
RATIONALLY 114 (2001). In short, without some special definition, plausibility
seems to be a trait that a hypothesis either has or does not have, rather than a
continuum onto which hypotheses can be placed and compared, and in any
event, it is unclear how one uncontroversially tests for the existence of plausibility or quantifies a hypothesis’s “degree” of plausibility. See Joseph Agassi,
Criteria for Plausible Arguments, 83 MIND 406, 410–11 (1974) (discussing
problems with a relative plausibility standard for judging the scientific acceptability of theses).
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test of a proposal.105 Given the restrictions on liberty associated
with paternalism and the attendant cognitive and moral hazards identified here, we believe that the paternalist should bear
the burden of demonstrating that the benefits of a paternalistic
intervention will likely outweigh the costs.
This is not to say that irrational behavior does not cause
significant inefficiencies in some domains, nor that legal regulation will never be needed to ameliorate the situation. Indeed,
our framework leads us to believe that there may be a significant role for the government to play with respect to compelling
informational disclosures in certain forms that make the information more user-friendly,106 encouraging competition, subsidizing or compelling some forms of education, and even restricting choices when doing so leads to net efficiency gains.
But a failure to take into account the direct and indirect costs
of paternalism may lead to perverse results, and, as a behavioral law and economics approach would caution, once a new
regulation is in place it may be difficult to dislodge due to a
status quo bias.107
CONCLUSION
One of the key insights of behavioral law and economics is
that context influences behavior in many unanticipated ways.
We have taken seriously this contextualist insight to consider
how government regulation intended to counter irrational tendencies may actually exacerbate the problem (i.e., we have examined irrational behavior as if it were endogenous to the regulatory context). Rather than advance any firm conclusions
about the hazards of paternalism, however, our primary goal
has been to raise a set of concerns that have received little attention within the behavioral law and economics literature that

105. See, e.g., DEBORAH G. MAYO, ERROR AND THE GROWTH OF EXPERIKNOWLEDGE 187 (1996) (“If hypotheses that fit the data equally well
were equally well supported . . . by the data, then this objection would have
considerable weight. But the very raison d’être of the severity demand is to
show that this is not so.”).
106. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Need to Know: Analytical and Psychological Criteria, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 55 (2000) (illustrating how to combine analyses of informational settings with psychological research to formulate effective informational disclosures).
107. See Jeffrey Stempel, Not-So-Peaceful Coexistence: Inherent Tensions in
Addressing Tort Reform, 4 NEV. L.J. 337, 351 (2003/2004) (“Applied to public
policy, legislation, and elections, the status quo bias probably operates to increase the burden on those seeking a change in laws or government.”).
MENTAL
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has become dominated by discussions of paternalistic solutions
to irrational tendencies. Of course, only further empirical research can determine whether our concerns are valid and, if so,
which paternalistic policies in which domains pose the greatest
moral and cognitive hazards.
An important benefit of this analytical exercise was an exposition of factors that should inform institutional design decisions aimed at addressing anomalous or irrational behavior.
Simply enumerating these factors illustrated the complexity of
paternalism, and, as David Shapiro argued several years ago,
the many interests implicated by paternalistic interventions
raise serious questions about the wisdom of courts engaging in
ex post paternalism.108 Yet courts seem increasingly willing to
endorse the descriptions and prescriptions of behavioral law
and economics.109 If we are right that cognitive and moral hazards accompany at least some instances of ex post paternalism,
then the courts would be well-advised to proceed much more
cautiously and perhaps even to leave decisions about paternalistic intervention to legislatures, which should be better able to
108. Shapiro argues for the primacy of legislatures in matters of paternalism. David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV.
519, 521 (1988).
109. See O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389
F.3d 973, 1016 (10th Cir. 2004) (McConnell, J., concurring) (“Notwithstanding
the tendency of those trained in economics to view opportunity costs as equivalent to actual expenditures, modern social science research has confirmed the
reality of ‘loss aversion’ . . . and the closely related ‘endowment effect.’”);
United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 335 (5th Cir. 2002) (“As behavioral
law and economics warns us, inadequate information, biases, and heuristics
often prevent individuals from acting rationally.”); Abrahamson v. Bd. of
Educ., 2002 WL 1354711, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002) (“This phenomenon,
called loss aversion or the endowment effect, might sway a teacher to retire at
the end of the Option period, even though he might not have chosen early retirement at the beginning of the three years.”); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages: Should Juries Decide?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 381, 382 n.5 (2003) (collecting cases citing the studies reported in CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002)); Neil Vidmar, Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform: Avoidance, Error, and Overreaching in Sunstein et al.’s
Punitive Damages, 53 EMORY L.J. 1359, 1361 (2004) (noting that Judge
Weinstein recently cited behavioral research on punitive damage decision
making as social authority); see also supra notes 47, 59. Of course, courts may
simply cite behavioral studies to support conclusions driven by other considerations, but in some cases the arguments of the behavioral law and economics
scholars may possess some motivational force. Moreover, we do not mean to
suggest that all of these invocations of behavioral economics raise the same
moral and cognitive hazard concerns, but they do suggest a growing willingness on the part of at least some courts to incorporate behavioral economics
into their opinions and perhaps even into their decision-making processes.

MITCHELL & KLICK_3FMT

2006]

06/12/2006 08:35:32 AM

REGULATION OF IRRATIONALITY

1663

consider competing values and marshal the evidence relevant
to optimal institutional design.

